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During the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, 
President Trump touted a number of treatments that many medical 
professionals considered dangerous. These treatments include 
hydroxychloroquine and disinfectants, which if misused could 
cause a patient’s death. This prompted Free Press to file an 
emergency petition with the FCC, arguing that broadcasters who 
report on Trump’s claims about these treatments without 
highlighting their dangers could be in violation of the 
Commission’s broadcast hoax rule. Free Press also requested the 
FCC require that broadcasters include disclaimers when reporting 
on such claims. This article examines whether the broadcast hoax 
rule has been violated here, and whether such disclaimers should 
be required. The preferred approach under the First Amendment is 
to leave it to the marketplace of ideas to ascertain the truth of 
Trump’s statements. This article ultimately concludes that the 
broadcast hoax rule is a poor fit for this case and that requiring 
disclaimers could chill broadcast coverage of the COVID-19 
pandemic, leaving the public less informed about this important 
public health issue. Counterspeech, or providing accurate 
information to help counteract false statements, is the preferable 
approach here. 
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In early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic swept the world, 
leaving government and medical officials seeking ways to treat and 
slow the spread of the disease. In March of that year, U.S. 
President Donald Trump, in one of many daily press briefings on 
COVID-19, touted the drugs hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine 
as potentially effective treatments in the fight against COVID-19.1 
This was in conflict with the thinking of many health officials, who 
were concerned about misuse of the drugs and the potential harm 
that could result.2  Following Trump’s statement, the Food and 
 
1 Ken Alltucker & Elizabeth Weise, US Coronavirus Cases Top 11,000, 
Trump Touts Two Potential 'Exciting' Treatments, USA TODAY (March 19, 
2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2020/03/19/trump-touts-
chloroquine-remdesevir-possible-coronavirus-treatments/2875965001/; 
Elizabeth Weise, Study of Trump-Touted Chloroquine for Coronavirus Stopped 
Due to Heart Problems, Deaths, USA TODAY (April 15, 2020,) 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2020/04/15/coronavirus-chloroquine-test-
halted-drug/2983129001/. 
2 Oliver Milman, Trump Touts Hydroxychloroquine as a Cure for Covid-19, 
THE GUARDIAN (April 6, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2020/apr/06/coronavirus-cure-fact-check-
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Drug Administration (FDA) warned that the two drugs had “not 
been shown to be safe and effective for treating or preventing 
COVID-19” and that their use could result in health problems, 
even death. 3 
Trump’s statement regarding hydroxychloroquine and 
chloroquine was but one of a number of inaccurate or misleading 
statements he had made concerning COVID-19 and its effects.4 
Among those concerned about Trump’s promotion of potentially 
dangerous drugs was Free Press, an organization aimed at 
promoting Internet and press freedom.5 Free Press asserted that 
broadcast news outlets have a responsibility to inform the public of 
the potential inaccuracy of Trump’s statements when covering or 
discussing them. Otherwise, said Free Press, broadcasters could be 
responsible for the harm that results to those who believe and act 
on those statements. 6 Free Press pointed to Trump’s promotion of 
chloroquine phosphate to treat COVID-19, as well as his March 19 
statement, “[Hydroxychloroquine has] been around for a long time, 
so we know if things don’t go as planned it's not going to kill 
anybody…. It’s shown very, very encouraging early results….”7 
Free Press alleged that the broadcast of statements such as these 
 
hydroxychloroquine-trump. 
3 Annie Karni & Katie Thomas, Trump Says He’s Taking 
Hydroxychloroquine, Prompting Warning From Health Experts, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/us/politics/trump-
hydroxychloroquine-covid-coronavirus.html?referringSource=articleShare; see 
also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA DRUG SAFETY COMMUNICATION: FDA 
CAUTIONS AGAINST USE OF HYDROXYCHLOROQUINE OR CHLOROQUINE FOR 
COVID-19 (May 24, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/137250/download. 
4 See, e.g., A Guide to Our Coronavirus Coverage, FACTCHECK.ORG, 
https://www.factcheck.org/a-guide-to-our-coronavirus-coverage/ (last visited 
May 30, 2020). 
5 Free Press, Media Kit,  https://www.freepress.net/news/media-kit (last 
visited May 30, 2020). 
6 Free Press, Emergency Petition for Inquiry into Broadcast of False 
Information on COVID-19 , at 2-7, 
https://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/2020-
03/free_press_petition_for_inquiry_to_fcc_re_broadcast_misinformation.pdf 
[hereinafter Free Press Petition]. 
7 Id. at 3-4 (citing CSPAN (@cspan), TWITTER (Mar. 19, 2020, 12:10 PM), 
https://twitter.com/cspan/status/1240672025989001221 (emphasis added)). 
32 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 15:3 
  
“precipitated the death of an Arizona man and hospitalization of 
his wife … when they ingested the drug because they said they had 
‘watched televised briefings during which President Trump talked 
about the potential benefits of chloroquine’ and believed it was 
safe because ‘it was all over TV.’” 8 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ruled on 
the Free Press petition before Trump made additional statements 
about potential treatments for COVID-19 that the organization 
would likely have found even more troublesome in their potential 
to cause harm. In May, Trump claimed to be taking 
hydroxychloroquine on a regular basis as a preventative measure 
against COVID-19,9 despite the FDA’s warnings against such use 
of the drug.10 In fact, Trump falsely claimed that the FDA issued 
no such warning.11 Observers were concerned “not just of the 
dangers it posed for the president’s health but also of the example 
it set.”12  
Trump then touted yet another potentially dangerous 
 
8 Id. at 3 (citing David Armstrong, Ava Kofman, & Topher Sanders, 
Doctors Are Hoarding Unproven Coronavirus Medicine by Writing 
Prescriptions for Themselves and Their Families, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/doctors-are-hoarding-unprovencoronavirus-
medicine-by-writing-prescriptions-for-themselves-and-their-families; Erika 
Edwards & Vaughn Hillyard, Man Dies After Taking Chloroquine in an Attempt 
to Prevent Coronavirus, NBC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/man-dies-after-ingesting-
chloroquine-attempt-prevent-coronavirus-n1167166). See also Daniel Brooks, 
Banner Health Experts Warn Against Self-Medicating to Prevent or Treat 
COVID-19, BANNER HEALTH (March 23, 2020), 
http://bannerhealth.mediaroom.com/chloroquinephosphate (the couple 
apparently ingested a similar-sounding ingredient, chloroquine phosphate, as a 
result) 
9 See Nikki Carvajal & Kevin Liptak, Trump Says He Is Taking 
Hydroxychloroquine Though Health Experts Question Its Effectiveness, CNN 
(May 19, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/18/politics/donald-trump-
hydroxychloroquine-coronavirus/index.html. 
10 Id.  
11 Daniel Dale, Fact Check: Trump Falsely Denies FDA Warning on 
Hydroxychloroquine, Baselessly Alleges Political Bias in Study, CNN (May 20, 
2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/19/politics/fact-check-trump-
hydroxychloroquine-study/index.html. 
12 Karni & Thomas, supra note 3. 
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treatment for the virus. In April, Trump discussed using 
disinfectants to treat COVID-19, stating, “and then I see the 
disinfectant, where it knocks it out in a minute. One minute. And is 
there a way we can do something like that, by injection inside or 
almost a cleaning. Because you see it gets in the lungs and it does a 
tremendous number on the lungs.”13 This prompted a reaction from 
medical and government officials warning against the use of 
disinfectants to treat the disease due to the associated potential 
dangers, including, again, death. Even the makers of Clorox and 
Lysol responded with warnings urging against the ingestion or 
injection of their products.14  
The warnings were warranted. The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention reported an increase in calls to poison 
control centers involving exposure to disinfectants following 
Trump’s statement. 15 Within 18 hours of the statement, New York 
City’s Department of Health and Mental Hygiene saw a similar 
increase in calls.16 A Maryland health hotline received so many 
calls with questions about the use of disinfectants to treat the 
disease that the state’s Emergency Management Agency issued “a 
warning that ‘under no circumstances’ should any disinfectant be 
taken to treat COVID-19.” 17 Illinois’ Department of Public Health 
issued a similar warning after a person tried to gargle mouthwash 
mixed with bleach. 18 Overall, the American Association of Poison 
 
13 User Clip: Trump on Injecting Disinfectant, C-SPAN (April 23, 2020), 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4871089/user-clip-trump-injecting-disinfectant. 
14 Maggie Haberman, Christine Hauser, Katie Rogers & Alan Yuhas, 
Trump’s Suggestion That Disinfectants Could Be Used to Treat Coronavirus 
Prompts Aggressive Pushback, N.Y. TIMES (April 24, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/us/politics/trump-inject-disinfectant-
bleach-coronavirus.html; John Bowden, Accidental Poisonings from Bleach and 
Other Disinfectants Spiked amid Coronavirus, THE HILL (May, 12, 2020, 
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/497312-accidental-poisonings-from-bleach-
and-other-disinfectants-spiked-amid. 
15 Id.; see also Aris Folley, Calls to Poison Control Centers Spike after 
Trump Disinfectant Comments, THE HILL (April 26, 2020), 
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/494744-poison-control-centers-report-
increase-in-calls-pertaining-to-exposure-to. 
16 Id.  
17 Haberman, Hauser, Rogers & Yuhas, supra note 14. 
18 Folley, supra note 15. 
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Control Centers reported a surge in “the number of calls to poison 
control hotlines regarding accidental poisoning from household 
cleaners and disinfectants” in April 2020 to more than double those 
of April 2019. 19 
The timing of this suggests that Trump’s touting of 
potentially dangerous treatments for COVID-19 has led some to 
try those treatments, endangering the health and well-being of 
those who do. In its emergency petition to the FCC, Free Press also 
put some of the blame for this on broadcast television stations that 
provided “context-less coverage” of Trump’s press conferences 
and inaccurate statements. 20 According to Free Press, the coverage 
of this this disinformation resulted in “substantial public harm,” 
including the death of the Arizona man discussed previously.21  
Free Press alleged that broadcasters who cover or repeat 
statements such as those Trump made about the efficacy of 
hydroxychloroquine without including disclaimers about the 
accuracy of the statements, could be in violation of the FCC’s 
broadcast hoax rule.22 The broadcast hoax rule allows the FCC to 
sanction broadcast television and radio stations that air false 
information in certain circumstances. One way that broadcasters 
can avoid violating the rule is to air disclaimers that the 
information presented is false or fictional. 23 This led Free Press to 
urge the FCC to formally recommend that “broadcasters 
prominently disclose when information they air is false or 
scientifically suspect,” even if the broadcaster is simply reporting 
on the president’s statements. 24 Said Free Press, “When the 
president tells dangerous lies about a public health emergency, 
broadcasters have a choice: don’t air them, or put those lies in 
context with disclaimers noting that they may be untrue and are 
 
19 Bowden, supra note 14. 
20 Free Press Petition, supra note 6, at 2. 
21 Id. at 3. 
22 Id. at 1-4. 
23 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 (2019). The disclaimers that Free Press pointed 
to are in the provision of the rule which provides that “[a]ny programming 
accompanied by a disclaimer will be presumed not to pose foreseeable harm if 
the disclaimer clearly characterizes the program as a fiction and is presented in a 
way that is reasonable under the circumstances.” 
24 Free Press Petition, supra note 6, at 7. 




 Responding to the Free Press petition, the FCC observed 
that the request would require a “novel” and “expand[ed]” 
construction of the broadcast hoax rule, noting that that 
construction “could apply far more broadly” than requested in the 
current case. 26 It also stated that the request “misconstrues the 
Commission’s rules and seeks remedies that would dangerously 
curtail the freedom of the press embodied in the First 
Amendment.”27 Accordingly, the FCC denied the Free Press 
petition, “both because the broadcast hoax rule does not support 
such a reading and because the relief requested raises significant 
First Amendment concerns.” 28 
 While the FCC declined to involve itself here, the Free 
Press petition does raise the questions of whether there is a role for 
the FCC to play with regard to broadcasters that provide inaccurate 
or misleading information in their coverage of Trump’s statements 
about COVID-19. As Free Press pointed out, the broadcast hoax 
rule does allow the FCC to punish broadcasters that air false 
information in certain circumstances. 29 Could the FCC use the rule  
to help stop the spread of misinformation about COVID-19? And 
should the FCC require broadcasters to air disclaimers about the 
potential inaccuracy of Trump’s statements? 
 To answer those questions, Part II examines the 
circumstances leading up to the FCC’s adoption of the broadcast 
hoax rule. Part III then discusses each of the rule’s requirements, 
as well as the FCC’s reasoning for including those requirements in 
the rule. In addition, each of those requirements are examined in 
conjunction with the coverage of Trump’s misinformation about 
treating COVID-19. Part IV then analyzes the application of the 
broadcast hoax rule in this situation, concluding that the rule is a 
 
25 Id. 
26 Letter from Michelle M. Carey, Chief, Media Bureau and Thomas M. 
Johnson, Jr., General Counsel, to Jessica J. González and Gaurav Laroia, Free 
Press, Federal Communications Commission, DA 20-385, April 6, 2020, at 3, 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-20-385A1.pdf  [hereinafter FCC 
Response]. 
27 Id. at 1. 
28 Id. at 3. 
29 Free Press Petition, supra note 6, at 2-3. 
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poor fit for these circumstances. Part V analyzes the First 
Amendment implications of requiring disclaimers in broadcast 
news coverage of Trump’s inaccurate statements as requested by 
Free Press, concluding that such a requirement would likely be 
unconstitutional. Part VI then considers the implication of the 
rule’s limitation to broadcast media. In Part VII, the article 
concludes that the FCC should not seek to apply the broadcast 
hoax rule in the manner urged by Free Press, but should rather rely 
on the marketplace of ideas to provide counterspeech to counteract 
the harms resulting from Trump’s disinformation. Otherwise, 
broadcasters may be chilled in providing information about 
COVID-19, leaving the public potentially less informed about the 
virus than they otherwise would be. 
At the outset, it should be noted that there is a significant 
limitation on the FCC’s use of the broadcast hoax rule, in that the 
applies only to broadcasters, which means TV and radio stations. It 
does not apply to cable news networks, such as FOX News or 
CNN. 30  Nor does the rule apply to newspapers or websites.31 This 
stems from the fact that broadcasters are licensed by the FCC to 
use a scarce public resource: the electromagnetic spectrum, which 
is used for all forms of wireless communication.32 Because of “the 
unique physical limitations of the broadcast medium,” there are 
fewer frequencies available for broadcast television and radio 
stations than there is demand for them, a concept known as 
“scarcity.”33 The Supreme Court has offered the following 
explanation of scarcity and its implication for the First Amendment 
rights of broadcasters: 
 
30 See, e.g., FCC Response supra note 26 at 3, n.19.  
31 See, e.g., What We Do, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 
https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/what-we-do (last visited May 30, 2020); Michael 
O’Rielly, FCC Regulatory Free Arena, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSION (June 1, 2018), https://www.fcc.gov/news-
events/blog/2018/06/01/fcc-regulatory-free-arena.  
32 See, e.g., What Is Spectrum? A Brief Explainer, CTIA (June 5, 2018), 
https://www.ctia.org/news/what-is-spectrum-a-brief-explainer. 
33 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994) 
(citing FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984); Red 
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-389, 396-399 (1969); 
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943)). 
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As a general matter, there are more would-be 
broadcasters than frequencies available in the 
electromagnetic spectrum. And if two broadcasters were to 
attempt to transmit over the same frequency in the same 
locale, they would interfere with one another’s signals, so 
that neither could be heard at all. The scarcity of broadcast 
frequencies thus required the establishment of some 
regulatory mechanism to divide the electromagnetic 
spectrum and assign specific frequencies to particular 
broadcasters. In addition, the inherent physical limitation 
on the number of speakers who may use the broadcast 
medium has been thought to require some adjustment in 
traditional First Amendment analysis to permit the 
Government to place limited content restraints, and impose 
certain affirmative obligations, on broadcast licensees. As 
we said in Red Lion, “where there are substantially more 
individuals who want to broadcast than there are 
frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable 
First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right 
of every individual to speak, write, or publish.”34  
 
Thus, scarcity allows for greater government regulation of 
broadcast speech than of speech in other forms of media. One way 
that broadcast speech is regulated that speech in other forms of 
media is not is that broadcast TV and radio stations, and they 
alone, are subject to the FCC’s broadcast hoax rule.  
 
I. REASONS FOR ENACTMENT OF THE BROADCAST HOAX RULE  
 
Despite having some ability to do so, as a general matter, 
the FCC is reluctant to involve itself in a review of broadcast 
program content, particularly news. There are statutory and 
 
34 Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 637-38 (citations omitted). It has been 
argued that the scarcity rationale “should be overruled because the rationale . . . 
has been overtaken by technological change and the wide availability of 
multiple other choices for listeners and viewers.” Fox v. FCC, 567 U.S. 239, 258 
(2012) (citations omitted). The Court, however, has so far declined to do this. 
See id. (“These arguments need not be addressed here.”) 
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constitutional reasons for this. As the FCC has observed, “Section 
326 of the Act prohibits the Commission from censoring radio 
communications, and the First Amendment to the Constitution 
strictly limits the Commission’s authority to interfere with the 
programming decisions of licensees.”35 Because of this, the FCC 
has stated that its “role in overseeing program content is very 
limited.” 36 
Despite its reluctance to involve itself in reviews of 
program content, in 1991, the FCC proposed adopting the 
broadcast hoax rule because “serious broadcast hoaxes have 
occurred where the stations involved fabricated stories concerning 
a crime or catastrophe that alarmed the public and resulted in the 
needless diversion of public safety or law enforcement 
resources.”37 These “fabricated stories” include a radio station 
falsely airing a warning that the U.S. was under nuclear attack, 38  a 
radio station falsely reporting that an on-air host had been shot in 
the head in the station parking lot, 39  a radio station’s false report 
of a nearby volcanic eruption, 40  and a morning radio show on 
which the hosts orchestrated a false murder confession from a 
caller to the show. 41 
In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the broadcast 
hoax rule, the FCC expressed its belief “that certain types of 
broadcast hoaxes are so potentially harmful that they are 
 
35 TVT License, Inc., 22 FCC Rcd. 13,591, ¶ 17 (2007) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 
326, U.S. Const., amend. I). 
36 FCC Response, supra note 26, at 2 (citing FCC, THE PUBLIC AND 
BROADCASTING 7 (August 2019), https://www.fcc.gov/media/radio/public-
and-broadcasting) (quotations omitted). 
37 Amendment of Part 73 Regarding Broad. Hoaxes, Report and Order 
(Proceeding Terminated), 7 FCC Rcd. 4106, ¶ 2 (1992) [hereinafter Broadcast 
Hoax Report & Order]. 
38 See FCC Response, supra note 26, at 2-3. 
39 Broadcast Hoax Report & Order, supra note 37, at n.1 (citing Letter to 
WALE-AM, 7 FCC Rcd 2345 (MMB 1992)). See also FCC Response, supra 
note 26, at 2-3. 
40 Broadcast Hoax Report & Order, supra note 37, at n.1 (citing Letter to 
WCCC-AM/FM, (MMB, dated July 26, 1990)). 
41 Id. (citing Letter to KROQ-FM, 6 FCC Rcd 7262 (1991)). See also FCC 
Response, supra note 26, at 2-3. 
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inconsistent with the public interest.”42 Under its then-existing 
policies, the Commission had only two options to take against 
broadcasters who aired hoaxes such as these: it “can either issue a 
letter of admonition, which may be considered on renewal or sale 
of the station or, in extreme cases, it can revoke a station’s 
license.” 43  The broadcast hoax rule would offer the FCC a choice 
between these two extremes, in that the rule would allow the 
Commission to fine stations for violations.44 This option would be 
“less drastic than license revocation or non-renewal, but [have] 
more deterrence value than admonition.”45 
The FCC was mindful of crafting a rule that would address 
its concerns about hoaxes with the potential to cause harm without 
overly burdening broadcasters’ First Amendment rights or unduly 
chilling broadcast speech.46 In this vein, the FCC stated that it was 
not seeking “to address harmless pranks, or to deter broadcasts that 
might upset some listeners but do not pose a substantial threat to 
public health and safety.”47 As an example, the FCC did not intend 
the rule to cover “incidents such as the April Fool’s joke 
perpetrated recently by a station, which announced that one of the 
stars of the city’s National Football League team had been traded. 
While this prank undoubtedly distressed some football fans, it is 
our intent to focus instead on a narrow category of cases that 
present the potential for substantial public harm.”48 
 
II. THE BROADCAST HOAX RULE AND ITS APPLICATION 
 
In 1992, the FCC adopted the broadcast hoax rule, which 
states: 
 
No licensee or permittee of any broadcast station shall 
 
42 Amendment of Part 73 of the FCC’s Rules Regarding Broad. Hoaxes, 
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 6 FCC Rcd. 6935, ¶ 1 (1991) [hereinafter 
Broadcast Hoax NPRM]. 
43 Broadcast Hoax Report & Order, supra note 37, at ¶ 2. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at ¶ 18. 
46 Broadcast Hoax NPRM, supra note 42, at ¶ 1. 
47 Id. at ¶ 2. 
48 Id. 
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broadcast false information concerning a crime or a 
catastrophe if: 
(a) The licensee knows this information is false; 
(b) It is foreseeable that broadcast of the 
information will cause substantial public harm, and 
(c) Broadcast of the information does in fact 
directly cause substantial public harm. 
Any programming accompanied by a disclaimer will be 
presumed not to pose foreseeable harm if the disclaimer 
clearly characterizes the program as a fiction and is 
presented in a way that is reasonable under the 
circumstances.49 
 
A note to the rule states: 
 
For purposes of this rule, “public harm” must begin 
immediately, and cause direct and actual damage to 
property or to the health or safety of the general public, or 
diversion of law enforcement or other public health and 
safety authorities from their duties. The public harm will be 
deemed foreseeable if the licensee could expect with a 
significant degree of certainty that public harm would 
occur. A “crime” is any act or omission that makes the 
offender subject to criminal punishment by law. A 
“catastrophe” is a disaster or imminent disaster involving 
violent or sudden event affecting the public.50 
 
The broadcast hoax rule has four prongs. First, a station 
must air false information concerning a crime or catastrophe. 
Second, the station must know that the information is false. Third, 
it must be foreseeable that broadcasting the false information will 
cause substantial public harm. Fourth, the broadcast of the false 
information must in fact cause immediate and substantial public 
harm. All four prongs must be met for the rule to be violated.51 
Each prong, and their application to the Free Press request, is 
 
49 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 (2019). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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considered next. However, the FCC has rarely considered possible 
rule violations, and has never found a station to have violated the 
rule.52 As a result, there is little case law on the broadcast hoax 
rule, which makes it difficult “to predict for certain how it might 
be applied to factual contexts.” 53 
 
A.   Prong 1: Airing False Information Concerning a Crime or 
Catastrophe 
 
The FCC decided to limit application of the rule to the 
broadcast of false information concerning a crime or catastrophe. 
With all four of the rule’s elements, the FCC sought to target the 
rule narrowly to avoid infringing on broadcasters’ First 
Amendment rights or chilling broadcast speech. 54 The limitation to 
crimes or catastrophes was intended to limit the rule’s application 
to the kinds of hoaxes that had historically caused the commission 
the most concern, rather than harmless pranks such as the April 
Fool’s Day joke that an NFL team’s star player had been traded. 55  
This prong would then apply to many of the hoaxes that prompted 
the FCC to adopt the rule, such as those involving a nuclear attack 
warning, an erupting volcano, a shot station employee, and a 
murder confession. 56 
The COVID-19 pandemic would not seem to qualify as a 
crime under the rule, but it might be considered a catastrophe, as 
that term is generally understood. However, that does not mean it 
would qualify as a catastrophe under the broadcast hoax rule. The 
rule defines “catastrophe” as “a disaster or imminent disaster 
involving [a] violent or sudden event affecting the public.”57 It 
 
52 Justin Levine, A History and Analysis of the Federal Communications 
Commission’s Response to Radio Broadcast Hoaxes, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 273, 
310-11 (2000); Joel Timmer, Potential FCC Actions Against “Fake News”: The 
News Distortion Policy and the Broadcast Hoax Rule, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 
30-31 (2019). 
53 Levine, supra note 52, at 311. 
54 Broadcast Hoax Report & Order, supra note 37, ¶ 9. 
55 Broadcast Hoax NPRM, supra note 42, ¶¶ 2-3. 
56 Broadcast Hoax Report & Order, supra note 37, at n.1; Levine, supra 
note 52, at 301-06. 
57 Broadcast Hoax NPRM, supra note 42, ¶ 8 n.14. 
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might be argued that the pandemic does not qualify as being 
“violent” or “sudden” as required by the rule, and with the lack of 
case law on the rule and its application, it is hard to know for 
certain how this requirement might be interpreted. In its dismissal 
of the Free Press petition, the FCC did refer to the pandemic as 
“one of the most severe public health crises in a century” and as a 
“national emergency.”58 Statements such as these could lend 
support to the pandemic qualifying as a catastrophe under rule. 
 
B.   Prong 2: Knowing the Information to Be False 
 
The second requirement of the broadcast hoax rule is that 
the station “licensee must have known that the broadcast material 
was false.”59 Here, the focus is not on whether Trump knew the 
information was false. Rather, it is the broadcaster who airs 
Trump’s statements that must know that the statements are false. In 
addition to such knowledge by the station licensee, this 
requirement could also be satisfied by “various employees of the 
station, as well as corporate officials if the license holder is a 
corporate entity” with such knowledge.60 Presumably, a 
broadcaster that did not know whether the statements were 
accurate or not would not satisfy this requirement, as it would not 
know that the information was false.61 
 The FCC addressed this requirement’s application to 
Trump’s statements in its dismissal of the Free Press emergency 
petition. There it argued that: 
 
a broadcaster’s decision to broadcast and comment on 
statements made by the President, relating to one of the 
most severe public health crises in a century, does not 
amount to airing an intentional or knowing falsehood. . . At 
this moment, broadcasters face the challenge of covering a 
rapidly-evolving, national, and international health crisis, in 
which new information—much of it medical or technical in 
 
58 FCC Response, supra note 26, at 3.  
59 Broadcast Hoax NPRM, supra note 42, ¶ 3. 
60 Levine, supra note 52, at 314.  
61 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 (2019). 
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nature and therefore difficult to corroborate or refute in real 
time—is continually revealed, vetted, and verified or 
dismissed. In addition, we note that the President and 
members of the White House Coronavirus Task Force, 
including public-health professionals, have held daily press 
conferences in which they exhaustively answer critical 
questions from the press. Under such circumstances, it is 
implausible, if not absurd, to suggest that broadcasters 
knowingly deceived the public by airing these press 
conferences or other statements by the President about 
COVID-19.62 
 
 In another context, the FCC was asked to determine 
whether a TV station knowingly misled the public with a news 
report on a drug that allegedly did not adequately highlight the 
dangers of the drug. In a 2007 proceeding, the FCC considered the 
accuracy of a TV news story on the safety of another drug, 
synthetic bovine growth hormone (BGH), where it was alleged that 
a TV station’s reporting on the drug failed to highlight the dangers 
of the drug. 63 In that case, two reporters for Tampa, Florida TV 
 
62 FCC Response, supra note 26, at 3.  
63 TVT License, Inc., 22 FCC Rcd. 13,591, ¶ 4 (2007). This case involved 
an alleged violation of the Commission’s news distortion policy, rather than the 
broadcast hoax rule. Like the broadcast hoax rule, the news distortion policy has 
four conditions that must be fulfilled for the policy to be violated. First, the 
station must deliberately intend to distort the news or mislead the audience. 
Second, there must be evidence, in addition to the news story itself, that the 
station intended to mislead the audience. Third, station ownership or 
management must initiate the distortion or know about it. Fourth, the public 
must be deceived about a matter of some significance, rather than just an 
incidental part of the news. See, e.g., Timmer, supra note 52, at 7-8. In contrast 
to the broadcast hoax rule, the FCC’s news distortion policy does not allow the 
Commission to fine stations that violate the policy. Rather, the policy is applied 
only at a TV or radio station’s license renewal, which occurs for stations every 
eight years. At that time, the FCC can consider whether a station has violated the 
policy in determining whether the station should have its license renewed. See, 
e.g., id. at 5-7. A detailed examination of the application of the news distortion 
policy to the broadcast of false information related to COVID-19 is beyond the 
scope of this article. However, given the similarities between the requirements 
of the broadcast hoax rule and the news distortion policy, and the First 
Amendment standards applicable to them, much of the analysis of the broadcast 
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station WTVT prepared a report highlighting the dangers of BGH. 
The station did not air that report, allegedly due to pressure on the 
station from Monsanto, the company that produces BGH.64 The 
station then aired a different report on the drug, which the original 
reporters alleged was misleading in presenting evidence of the 
safety of BGH. 65 
The original reporters cited one statement in the final BGH 
report as being “particularly troubling,” that being by “a Monsanto 
spokesperson who stated during an interview that milk from cows 
injected with BGH ‘is the same safe and wholesome product’ as 
milk from cows not injected with BGH.”66 This, the reporters 
argued, was not true.67 The reporters also claimed the final report 
contained a number of other misleading statements about the safety 
of BGH, and that the report failed to challenge certain statements 
from a Monsanto representative interviewed for the story, in 
particular “Monsanto’s assertion that ‘cancer experts don’t see a 
problem’ with BGH.”68 
The Commission was reluctant to make a determination 
regarding the accuracy of the challenged report, stating it 
“possesses ‘neither the expertise nor the desire to look over the 
shoulder of broadcast journalists and inquire why a particular piece 
of information was reported or not reported.”69 The FCC observed 
that the safety of the drug “is a matter of considerable controversy 
and scientific complexity.” The FCC pointed to the fact that the 
use of BGH had been approved by the FDA, and that “the 
American Medical Association (AMA), American Cancer Society, 
and American Dietetic Association have issued statements 
supporting its safety,” while other scientists and organization 
believed BGH to be “a public health threat.”70  
This led the FCC to conclude that: “[u]nder these 
 
hoax rule would likewise apply to the news distortion policy. 
64 TVT License, Inc., 22 FCC Rcd. 13,591, ¶¶ 2, 4. 
65 Id. at ¶¶ 2, 4, 5. 
66 Id. ¶ 4. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. ¶ 5 (citation omitted). 
69 Id. ¶ 17 (citing In Re CIA, 58 Rad.Reg2d (P & F) 1544, 1549 (1985)). 
70 Id. ¶ 18 (citations omitted). 
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circumstances, the truth of the complained-of Monsanto statement 
in the final BGH report that milk from BGH-injected cows is as 
‘safe and wholesome’ as other milk … cannot be ‘readily and 
definitively resolved.’”71 The Commission also stated that it would 
not second-guess “the type of journalistic judgment embodied in 
WTVT’s decision not to challenge certain Monsanto statements in 
the report, including the assertion that ‘cancer experts don’t see a 
problem’ with BGH use.”72 The FCC concluded that this was “a 
legitimate editorial dispute” between the reporters and the station, 
rather than a deliberate effort by the station to mislead the 
audience.73 The FCC thus found there to be no wrongdoing by the 
station here. 
With respect to Trump’s claims about hydroxychloroquine, 
it may be that, while there is some consensus that the drug should 
not be taken to treat COVID-19, there may also be some evidence 
to support Trump’s claim. In its response to the Free Press petition, 
the FCC pointed to others that shared similar assessments to 
Trump about the potential for the drug, including the FDA and 
other medical professionals.74 The appropriate time to determine 
knowledge about the falsity of the statement is the time that 
broadcasters originally covered the statement. What might be 
subsequently learned about the safety of the treatment is not 
relevant to that determination. It may be that at the time of the 
original coverage, the safety of using hydroxychloroquine and 
chloroquine, like the safety of BGH in the WTVT case, could not 
be “readily and definitely resolved.” Trump’s promotion of 
disinfectants to treat the virus seems to be an easier case, as the 
various parties that have weighed in on that issue have uniformly 
warned against the dangers of such a course of treatment. 75 Thus, a 
broadcaster reporting on Trump’s suggestion that disinfectants 
could be used to treat COVID-19 with knowledge that that was a 
dangerous treatment, without providing some disclaimer to that 
effect, could satisfy this particular component of the broadcast 
 
71 Id. (citations omitted). 
72 Id. (citations omitted). 
73 Id. ¶ 19. 
74 FCC Response, supra note 26, at 3. 
75 See, e.g., supra notes 13-19 and accompanying discussion. 




C.   Prong 3: Foreseeable that Broadcasting the False Information 
Will Cause Substantial Public Harm 
 
 The third component of the broadcast hoax rule is that it 
must be foreseeable that broadcast of the false information will 
cause substantial public harm.76 This means that “the licensee 
could expect with a significant degree of certainty that substantial 
harm would occur.”77 Here, there is a presumption “that the public 
will behave in a rational manner,”78 and the FCC will “not hold 
broadcasters accountable for unreasonable or unpredictable public 
conduct.”79 The FCC has said “that the nature of the broadcast will 
be the single greatest determinant of foreseeability. Thus, the more 
inherently unbelievable the broadcast, the more certain 
broadcasters can be that substantial public harm is 
unforeseeable.”80 
 Trump’s statements would most likely be covered by 
broadcasters in news programming, a category of programming 
that would seem to be on the far end of the spectrum away from 
“inherently unbelievable.” However, it would be necessary to 
examine the specific programs themselves, and the manner in 
which the information was presented in the programs, to see if the 
false statements were presented in a believable manner such that 
the likelihood of harm is foreseeable. The other significant 
question here is whether people who take hydroxychloroquine or 
disinfectants because of broadcast coverage of Trump’s statements 
about their potential effectiveness are acting rationally. If they are 
considered to be acting rationally, then the harm is foreseeable. If 
not, the harm would not be foreseeable.  
 The FCC addressed this issue in its response to the Free 
Press petition, in the context of Free Press’ allegation that Trump’s 
statements on hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine led an Arizona 
 
76 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 (2019). 
77 Broadcast Hoax Report & Order, supra note 37, ¶ 13. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Broadcast Hoax NPRM, supra note 42 n.6. 
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man to take a similar drug, resulting in the man’s death. Stating 
that: “this is not the kind of foreseeable harm contemplated by our 
rules,” the FCC elaborated, “While these events are tragic, the 
Presidential statements in question addressed the potential federal 
approval and administration of hydroxychloroquine and 
azithromycin by medical professionals. Under the circumstances, it 
was not reasonably foreseeable that a broadcaster’s decision to air 
this statement would result in viewers or listeners ingesting 
cleaning products to protect themselves from COVID-19.” 81 
 This element may be the most difficult to establish with 
regard to Trump’s inaccurate statements, even with regard to those 
about the use of disinfectants to treat the virus. First, the FCC’s 
just-quoted statement shows some inclination by the Commission 
against finding people taking the substances Trump touts as being 
potentially effective treatments for the disease as being 
foreseeable. Further, people acting in such a manner—such as 
ingesting or injecting disinfectants—are not acting rationally, 
particularly since the products would likely contain warnings 
against the dangers of so doing. As the FCC indicated, if the 
public’s reaction is not rationale, then any harm that is caused 
would not be deemed foreseeable as required by the rule. 
 
D.  Prong 4: Broadcast of the False Information Causes 
Immediate and Substantial Public Harm 
 
 The final element of the rule requires that “the hoax must in 
fact directly cause substantial public harm.” 82 This harm can take 
various forms, including “damage to the health or safety of the 
general public, diversion of law enforcement or other public health 
or safety authorities from their duties, and damage to property. In 
all cases, the public harm must be substantial. The public harm 
must also begin immediately after the broadcast and result in actual 
damage.”83 To be “immediate,” “the harm would have to occur 
contemporaneously or shortly after the broadcast.”84 For there to 
 
81 FCC Response, supra note 26, at 3-4 (citations omitted). 
82 Broadcast Hoax Report & Order, supra note 37, ¶ 16. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at n. 27. 
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be “actual damage,” “there must be injury in fact; the mere threat 
of harm is not sufficient.” 85 
The Commission included the requirement of substantial harm 
“to exclude cases where the harm to the public may be real, but is 
of such a minor nature that it does not offset the potential chilling 
effect of a broader rule.” 86 However, the Commission declined to 
specify how substantiality would be determined, preferring to  
determine that based on the facts of each case. It did observe, 
however, that hoaxes that “diverts local police and emergency 
resources from their duties, causes widespread public disorder or 
harms the health or safety of the general public, would most likely 
inflict substantial public harm.”87 It contrasted this with hoaxes 
that only resulted in a few members of the public contacting the 
police or complaining to the station as unlikely to meet the 
substantial public harm requirement.88 
 The harm allegedly caused by the broadcast of Trump’s 
statement—the misuse of drugs or disinfectants—seems to be 
substantial and actual public harm, in that misuse of these drugs 
can lead to severe injury and even death. However, a question here 
would be whether that harm was also “immediate,” as required by 
the rule. Did people take these drugs “contemporaneously or 
shortly after the broadcast”? How quickly would people need to 
take the drugs to qualify as having done so “shortly after the 
broadcast”? New York City’s Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene saw a rise in calls about the misuse of disinfectants within 
18 hours of Trump’s remarks on their potential efficacy.89 Would 
this qualify as immediate? Without precedent on these issues, it is 
hard to know for certain. Nevertheless, it seems likely that there 
would be some cases in which the harm was immediate, although 
many others in which it would not. The severity of the harm 
here—potential death—may be enough to fulfill this requirement 




86 Broadcast Hoax NPRM, supra note 42, ¶ 4. 
87 Broadcast Hoax Report & Order, supra note 37, ¶ 17. 
88 Id. 
89 Folley, supra note 15. 
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III. THE BROADCAST HOAX RULE IS A POOR FIT FOR THESE 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
Given the foregoing analysis, it does not seem likely that 
broadcasters who air Trump’s inaccurate statements about 
COVID-19 treatments without disclosing the inaccuracy of those 
statements would be found in violation of the broadcast hoax rule. 
There are several issues that may result in this situation failing to 
meet all the narrowing requirements of the rule. For instance, is the 
pandemic a “violent or sudden event affecting the public” as 
required to qualify as a catastrophe under the rule? Was there some 
basis at the time the statements were made and aired for believing 
that these treatments might be effective, even if there were also a 
significant amount of contradictory evidence, such that the FCC 
would be unwilling to make a judgement on whether the 
statements were actually false? Is it foreseeable that viewers and 
listeners would take these drugs or disinfectants after broadcasters 
aired Trump’s statements about them, and are people who do so 
acting rationally? And did those who suffered harm from taking 
the drugs or disinfectant as a result of broadcast coverage of 
Trump’s statements take them contemporaneously with or shortly 
after the broadcast, as required by the rule? All of these issues 
make it doubtful that broadcasters have fulfilled all of the 
requirements necessary to violate the broadcast hoax rule in these 
circumstances. It appears the FCC acted properly in rejecting the 
Free Press request to apply the broadcast hoax rule here. 
Also supporting the conclusion that the FCC could not 
properly apply the rule here is the fact that the rule allows 
broadcasters a presumption against programming being deemed to 
pose foreseeable harm when it is accompanied by a “disclaimer 
that clearly characterizes the program as a fiction and is presented 
in a way that is reasonable under the circumstances.”90 The false 
“news reports” that led to the Commission’s adoption of the rule 
were all fictional stories that originated with the stations 
themselves, rather than accurate reports of a government official’s 
 
90 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 (2019). 
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statements on a matter of great public concern.91  All of this lends 
support to the FCC’s observation that the Free Press request would 
require it to apply the broadcast hoax rule in a “novel” and 
“expand[ed] . . . construction of the rule,”92 one which 
“misconstrue[d]” the rule.93 Thus, applying the broadcast hoax rule 
in the manner urged by Free Press would greatly expand the rule 
beyond the narrow sets of circumstances for which it was 
designed, and to which it has been applied in the past.  
 
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES WITH MANDATED DISCLAIMERS 
 
In addition to enforcement of its broadcast hoax rule, Free 
Press also urged the Commission to “immediately issue an 
emergency policy statement or enforcement guidance 
recommending that broadcasters prominently disclose when 
information they air is false or scientifically suspect. We 
recommend that television disclosures appear in writing in the 
lower third and orally, and that radio broadcasters correct 
misinformation about COVID-19 in oral reporting after press 
conferences and immediately following other instances when false 
information airs.” 94 
The FCC rejected this request as being  
 
inconsistent with the First Amendment. Requiring such 
disclosures would constitute compelled speech, and 
‘recommending’ such disclosures through enforcement 
guidance or a policy statement would constitute 
government coercion by another name. . . [It would also] 
improperly involve the federal government in making 
editorial judgments about whether broadcasters had 
accurately and sufficiently evaluated claims made by the 
President and other government officials. Moreover, 
pressuring broadcasters to air such disclosures would 
impose significant burdens on them, burdens that could 
 
91 See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying discussion. 
92 FCC Response, supra note 26, at 3. 
93 Id. at 1 
94 Free Press Petition, supra note 6, at 7. 
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chill news coverage at a time when information is one of 
the only weapons the American public has to protect itself 
from a contagious and deadly virus.95 
 
The FCC’s analysis on this point appears to be correct. 
Along with the First Amendment issues raised by the government 
requiring broadcasters to provide specified speech, such a 
requirement could cause a chilling effect, leading broadcasters to 
actually reduce their coverage of the COVID-19 crisis for fear of 
violating the FCC’s requirements, or for even having to defend 
themselves in a proceeding to determine whether the rule was 
violated.96 Furthermore, counterspeech can provide a less 
restrictive and possibly more effective alternative to the 
Commission’s requiring disclaimers in this context.97 Finally, such 
disclaimers would be significantly underinclusive in preventing the 
harm that Free Press intends to prevent. Each of these issues is 
discussed in more detail below.98 
The Supreme Court has observed that “Discussion of public 
issues . . . [is] integral to the operation of the system of government 
established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the 
broadest protection to such political expression in order ‘to assure 
[the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people.’”99 Political 
speech is provided this protection to allow the public to engage in 
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate” on public issues.100 
Significantly, this protection is not dependent on whether a 
speaker’s claims are true or accurate.101 
 
95 FCC Response, supra note 26, at 4-5. 
96 See infra notes 117-40 and accompanying discussion. 
97 See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying discussion. 
98 See infra notes 141-50 and accompanying discussion. 
99 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (citations omitted). 
100 Id. 
101 Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1455 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)). The broadcast hoax rule does not purport to 
punish false speech due simply to its falsity, but instead has additional 
requirements that narrow its applicability. As Justice Breyer has observed, laws 
targeting false statements that survive First Amendment scrutiny tend to contain 
narrowing elements that “limit the scope of their application….” U.S. v. Alvarez, 
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The freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment 
includes “the decision of both what to say and what not to say,”102 
or, in other words, “both the right to speak freely and the right to 
refrain from speaking at all.”103 The Supreme Court has struck 
down a number of government compelled speech requirements, 
including one requiring New Hampshire motorists to display the 
state motto “Live Free or Die” on their license plates,104  a North 
Carolina requirement that professional fundraisers disclose to 
potential donors the average percentage of gross receipts actually 
turned over to charities by the fundraiser,105 and a West Virginia 
requirement that all public school students and teacher salute the 
American flag.106 
Another compelled speech case is Miami Herald v. 
Tornillo, in which the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality 
of a compelled speech requirement for newspapers. s.107  That case 
involved a Florida “right of reply” statute that gave “a political 
candidate a right to equal space to reply to criticism and attacks on 
his record by a newspaper…”108 Specifically, if a newspaper 
attacked the personal character or official record of a political 
 
567 U.S. 709, 734 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). The FCC crafted the 
broadcast hoax rule with several narrowing elements to avoid burdening 
substantially more speech than necessary to achieve its goal. In fact, Justice 
Breyer has cited the broadcast hoax rule as an example of a statute targeting 
falsity that included narrowing elements. Id. at 735 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“Statutes prohibiting false claims of terrorist attacks, or other lies about the 
commission of crimes or catastrophes, require proof that substantial public harm 
be directly foreseeable, or, if not, involve false statements that are very likely to 
bring about that harm.” See, e.g., 47 CFR § 73.1217 (2011) (requiring showing 
of foreseeability and actual substantial harm).). For a detailed discussion of the 
constitutionality of the broadcast hoax rule, see Timmer, supra note 50, at 47-
50. 
102 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988). 
103 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (citing W. Va. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-634 (1943); id., at 645 (Murphy, J., 
concurring)). 
104 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717. 
105 Riley, 487 U.S. at 795-801. 
106 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
107 Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 
U.S. 241 (1974). 
108 Id. at 243. 
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candidate, that candidate had “the right to demand that the 
newspaper print, free of cost to the candidate, any reply the 
candidate may make to the newspaper’s charges. The reply must 
appear in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as 
the charges which prompted the reply, provided it does not take up 
more space than the charges. .”109 
The Court viewed the right of reply requirement as 
“operat[ing] as a command in the same sense as a statute or 
regulation forbidding [a newspaper] to publish specified matter.”110  
Given the consequences of a newspaper’s publication of any news 
or commentary to which the statute might apply, the Court thought 
that, “editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid 
controversy. Therefore, under the operation of the Florida statute, 
political and electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced. 
Government-enforced right of access inescapably ‘dampens the 
vigor and limits the variety of public debate.’”111 
The Court also discussed how the law intruded on editors’ 
function: 
 
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit 
for news, comment, and advertising. The choice of material 
to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to 
limitations on the size and content of the paper, and 
treatment of public issues and public officials—whether 
fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control 
and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how 
governmental regulation of this crucial process can be 
exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a 
free press as they have evolved to this time. .112 
 
Finding the statute unconstitutional, the Court observed, “A 
responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press 
responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many 
 
109 Id. at 244. 
110 Id. at 256. 
111 Id. at 257 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)). 
112 Id. at 258. 
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other virtues it cannot be legislated.”113 
Prior to its holding in Miami Herald, however, the Court 
came to the opposite conclusion on a similar law that applied only 
to broadcasters. That law was the fairness doctrine, which had two 
requirements: (1) that broadcasters cover controversial issues of 
public importance, and (2) that they cover opposing sides of those 
issues.114  In Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, Reverend Billy James 
Hargis, on a radio show on Pennsylvania station WGCB, attacked 
author Fred J. Cook, saying “that Cook had been fired by a 
newspaper for making false charges against city officials; that 
Cook had then worked for a Communist-affiliated publication; that 
he had defended Alger Hiss and attacked J. Edgar Hoover and the 
Central Intelligence Agency; and that he had now written a ‘book 
to smear and destroy Barry Goldwater.’”115 Upon learning of the 
broadcast, Cook demanded that the station provide him with free 
airtime to respond to the attack, which the station refused. The 
FCC determined that the station “had failed to meet its obligation 
under the fairness doctrine . . . to send a tape, transcript, or 
summary of the broadcast to Cook and offer him reply time . . .”116 
In ruling on the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine’s 
right of reply requirement, the Court considered whether the 
requirement would lead to a chilling effect, causing broadcasters to 
reduce or eliminate their coverage of controversial public issues.117 
The Court observed that, at the time, the FCC had indicated that 
possibility was “at best speculative.”118  The Court also noted that 
the broadcast networks had “taken pains to present controversial 
issues in the past, and even now they do not assert that they intend 
 
113 Id. at 256. 
114 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969) (citing 
Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949); United Broad. Co., 
10 F.C.C. 515 (1945); New Broad. Co., 6 P & F Radio Reg. 258 (1950)). 
115 Id. at 371. 
116 Id. at 372 (citing Times-Mirror Broad. Co., 24 P & F Radio Reg. 404 
(1962)). This was later codified by the FCC as the “personal attack” rule (47 
C.F.R. § 73.123 (1968) (repealed 2000)). At the time of the incident, the right of 
reply requirement was considered an aspect of the fairness doctrine. See id. at 
369-71. 
117 Id. at 392-93. 
118 Id. 
2020 NEWS REPORTING ON TRUMP’S COVID-19 TREATMENTS 55 
 
 
to abandon their efforts in this regard.”119 Concluding that the 
fairness doctrine had not had a chilling effect in the past, the Court 
nevertheless indicated that “if experience with the administration 
of these doctrines indicates that they have the net effect of 
reducing rather than enhancing the volume and quality of 
coverage, there will be time enough to reconsider the constitutional 
implications.”120 
The Court in Red Lion also discussed how the scarcity of 
broadcast frequencies required a limitation on the number of TV 
and radio stations, and how this in turn justified a lower level of 
First Amendment protection for broadcasting, as opposed to other 
forms of media, such as newspapers, which do not suffer from 
such scarcity.121 Thus, due to differences in the forms of media to 
which the two laws applied, and the implications of those 
differences for the level of First Amendment protection accorded 
those forms of media, the Court allowed a right of reply 
requirement to stand for the broadcast media, while it found a 
similar requirement in the print media to be unconstitutional. 
Another significant reason why the Court allowed the requirement 
to stand in Red Lion was because it did not see a chilling effect 
resulting from it. Finally, and significantly, the Court indicated that 
if it turned out that the requirement did cause a chilling effect, its 
conclusion in Red Lion could be reconsidered. 
As it turned out, the FCC later concluded that the fairness 
doctrine did lead to a chilling effect, leading it to eliminate the rule 
as being unconstitutional in 1987. Relying on a comprehensive 
1985 FCC report on the fairness doctrine, the Commission 
concluded that “the fairness doctrine ‘chills’ speech,”122 by 
“thwart[ing] the purpose that it is designed to promote. Instead of 
enhancing the discussion of controversial issues of public 




121 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying discussion. 
122 In re Syracuse Peace Council Against TV Station WTVH Syracuse, 2 
FCC Rcd. 5043, 5043 (1987) (citations omitted) (hereinafter “Fairness Doctrine 
Decision”). 
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speech.”123 Specifically, the Commission determined that the 
fairness doctrine gave broadcasters 
 
a powerful incentive not to air controversial issue 
programming above that minimal amount required by the 
first part of the doctrine [that broadcasters provide coverage 
of controversial issues of public importance]. Each time a 
broadcaster presents what may be construed as a 
controversial issue of public importance, it runs the risk of 
a complaint being filed, resulting in litigation and penalties, 
including loss of license. This risk still exists even if a 
broadcaster has met its obligations by airing contrasting 
viewpoints [the second requirement of the fairness 
doctrine], because the process necessarily involves a vague 
standard, the application and meaning of which is hard to 
predict. Therefore, by limiting the amount of controversial 
issue programming to that required by the first prong (i.e., 
its obligation to cover controversial issues of vital 
importance to the community), a licensee is able to lessen 
the substantial burdens associated with the second prong of 
the doctrine (i.e., its obligation to present contrasting 
viewpoints) while conforming to the strict letter of its 
regulatory obligations.124 
 
Even broadcasters who believe they have presented 
balanced coverage of controversial issues “may be inhibited by the 
expenses of being second-guessed by the government in defending 
a fairness doctrine complaint at the Commission, and if the case is 
litigated in court, the costs of an appeal.”125 According the FCC, 
this was “not merely speculative,” as the Commission had 
compiled in its 1985 report “numerous instances in which the 
broadcasters decided that it was ‘safer’ to avoid broadcasting 
specific controversial issue programming, such as series prepared 
for local news programs, than to incur the potentially burdensome 
administrative, legal, personnel, and reputational costs of either 
 
123 Id. at 5049 (citation omitted). 
124 Id. (citations omitted). 
125 Id. 
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complying with the doctrine or defending their editorial decisions 
to governmental authorities.”126 This included stations refusing to 
present editorials, not accepting political and public issue 
advertisements, and not airing programming discussing 
controversial issues.127 
The FCC pointed out that the speech regulated by the 
fairness doctrine—“opinions on controversial issues of public 
importance”—was that “which the Framers of the Bill of Rights 
were most anxious to protect—speech that is ‘indispensible to the 
discovery and spread of political truth.’”128 The Commission went 
on to observe “that the enforcement of the doctrine requires the 
‘minute and subjective scrutiny of program content,’ which 
perilously treads upon the editorial prerogatives of broadcast 
journalists.”129  It also forced the Commission “to undertake the 
dangerous task of evaluating particular viewpoints,” and “to 
second-guess broadcasters’ judgment on the issues they cover, as 
well as on the manner and balance of coverage.”130 The FCC 
further pointed out that the “First Amendment was adopted to 
protect the people not from journalists, but from government,” 
giving “the people the right to receive ideas that are unfettered by 
government interference.”131 It acknowledged that “[t]here is no 
doubt that the electronic media is powerful and that broadcasters 
can abuse their freedom of speech. But the framers of the 
Constitution believed that the potential for abuse of private 
freedoms posed far less a threat to democracy than the potential for 
abuse by a government given the power to control the press.”132 
All of this led the FCC to conclude that: “the fairness doctrine in 
operation disserves both the public’s right to diverse sources of 
information and the broadcaster’s interest in free expression. Its 
chilling effect thwarts its intended purpose, and it results in 
excessive and unnecessary government intervention into the 
 
126 Id. at 5050 (citations omitted). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 5056. 
129 Id. at 5051 (citations omitted). 
130 Id. (citations omitted). 
131 Id. at 5057 (emphasis in original). 
132 Id. 
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editorial processes of broadcast journalists.”133 The FCC thus 
found the Fairness Doctrine to violate the First Amendment and 
eliminated the rule.134 
 Concern over such a chilling effect is a significant reason 
why even false speech is protected by the First Amendment.135 As 
the Supreme Court has observed, “some false statements are 
inevitable if there is to be an open and vigorous expression of 
views in public and private conversation, expression the First 
Amendment seeks to guarantee.”136 The First Amendment protects 
speech on political issues, both that which is true and that which 
may not be, to promote the public’s ability to engage in 
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate” on public issues.137  
Punishing the press for covering false statements in these situations 
might lead the press to avoid covering some statements on issues 
of public concern, even though some or all might be true, out of 
fear that some may turn out not be true and the station would risk 
prosecution or punishment. Thus, “[t]he First Amendment requires 
that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that 
matters.”138 
 Allowing the press to escape punishment by proving the 
statements to be true does not eliminate this chilling effect. News 
organizations may still be concerned about the difficulty of 
proving all aspects of their stories true in court, or even just about 
the difficulties and expense of having to do so. This is a reason 
why defendants in libel actions cannot be required to prove the 
truth of their statements in order to escape liability; rather, the 
burden is on the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the statement.139 
 
133 Id. at 5052. 
134 Id. 
135 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 734 (2012) (plurality opinion) 
(“Absent from those few categories where the law allows content-based 
regulation of speech is any general exception to the First Amendment for false 
statements.”). 
136 Id. at 718 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964)). 
137 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (citations omitted). 
138 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974). 
139 See Mark A. Franklin & Daniel J. Bussell, Defamation and the First 
Amendment: New Perspectives: The Plaintiff’s Burden in Defamation, 
Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 826-27 (1984) (citing 
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The Court offered this explanation for that requirement: 
 
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee 
the truth of all his factual assertions—and to do so on pain 
of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount—leads to 
a comparable “self-censorship.” Allowance of the defense 
of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, 
does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. Even 
courts accepting this defense as an adequate safeguard have 
recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the 
alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars. Under 
such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be 
deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is 
believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, 
because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear 
of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only 
statements which “steer far wider of the unlawful zone.” 
The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of 
public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.140 
 
This same chilling effect could also result from requiring 
broadcasters to provide disclaimers when covering false statements 
made by Trump. First, such a requirement would force 
broadcasters covering Trump’s statements about COVID-19 
treatments to evaluate the accuracy of those statements while at the 
same time covering an unfolding news story. Broadcasters who fail 
to provide such disclaimers in these situations would risk being 
investigated and sanctioned by the government. Even if the 
broadcaster were to prevail in such an investigation, it would still 
incur the time and expense of having to defend itself, and the 
station’s reputation may be tarnished due to its being under 
investigation by the FCC. In addition, it would put the FCC in the 
position of having to determine which of Trump’s statements about 
COVID-19 treatments are accurate and which are not. As with the 
 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86). 
140 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (citations omitted). 
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fairness doctrine, stations may decide to reduce or eliminate their 
coverage of Trump’s statements to avoid the possibility of being 
entangled this quagmire. 
 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIMITATION TO BROADCAST MEDIA 
 
 Even if the FCC were to do as Free Press requested and 
enforce the broadcast hoax rule and require broadcasters to air 
disclaimers, this would have limited effectiveness in countering the 
spread of false information, further undercutting the 
constitutionality of these actions. As has been previously 
discussed, that is because both rules apply only to broadcasters, 
meaning TV and radio stations.141 The FCC could target stations 
that air the newscasts of the big four broadcast networks: ABC, 
CBS, NBC, and FOX,142 or the local newscasts of TV stations 
themselves. Significantly, the broadcast hoax rule not apply to 
cable news networks, newspapers, or websites.143 Of these three 
major sources of news, the FCC only has authority over cable 
networks, and its ability to regulate cable network speech is more 
limited than with broadcast speech, as cable television is given 
greater First Amendment protection than broadcasting.144 
 Thus, targeting broadcasters in the manner requested by 
Free Press would address just a portion of the flow of 
misinformation from Trump’s inaccurate statements—that coming 
from broadcasters, but not that coming from cable news networks, 
 
141 See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying discussion. 
142 These broadcast networks are not licensed by the FCC; rather, the FCC 
licenses the individual stations that carry the broadcast networks’ programs. See 
FCC, THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING 4 (2008), 
https://www.fcc.gov/media/radio/public-and-broadcasting (“We license only 
individual broadcast stations.  We do not license TV or radio networks (such as 
CBS, NBC, ABC or Fox)….”). Any action would need to be targeted at the 
stations themselves, which would include some 200 stations for each of the big 
four broadcast networks, a small number of which are owned by the networks 
themselves, with the remainder owned by various other companies. See, e.g., 
List of NBC Television Affiliates, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_NBC_television_affiliates_. 
143 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying discussion. 
144 See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994). 
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newspapers, or websites. FCC enforcement of the rule would be of 
limited effectiveness in reducing the harm stemming from the 
misinformation, as any action against broadcasters would still 
allow misinformation to flow from these other major sources of 
news. This could further undermine the constitutionality of the 
broadcast hoax rule or required disclosures, as these both could be 
determined to be underinclusive in achieving their goal.  
 An example of the effect of under-inclusiveness on the 
constitutionality of a law targeting potentially harmful speech is 
provided by Brown v. Merchants Entertainment Association.145 In 
that case, California passed a law prohibiting the sale or rental of 
violent video games to minors.146 The state’s interest was to 
prevent the harm violent video games allegedlycaused minors.147  
However, California did not restrict minors’ access to other violent 
media, such as Saturday morning cartoons or pictures of guns.148 
As the Supreme Court saw it, “California has singled out the 
purveyors of video games for disfavored treatment—at least when 
compared to booksellers, cartoonists, and movie producers—and 
has given no persuasive reason why.”149 To the Court, this made 
the law “wildly underinclusive” in achieving its stated goal of 
protecting minors from the harms believed to be associated with 
their exposure to violent media, which, to the Court was enough 
for the law to be found unconstitutional.150   
 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
So, how are we to handle Trump’s false statements and 
seek to limit or eliminate the harm that might be caused by those 
statements? Counterspeech–additional speech which refutes the 
false statements—is the preferred remedy. As the Court has stated, 
“The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. This is 
 
145 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
146 Id. at 789 (citations omitted). 
147 Id. at 799-801. 
148 Id. at 801-02. 
149 Id. at 802. 
150 Id. at 801-02 (citing City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994); 
Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989)). 
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the ordinary course in a free society. The response to the 
unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to 
the straight-out lie, the simple truth.”151 The Free Press request 
would require that broadcasters provide this counterspeech along 
with their coverage of the statements themselves. However, this is 
government-mandated speech, which, as has been discussed, raises 
significant First Amendment concerns.  
 The First Amendment is grounded on the theory “that the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market.”152 Thus, rather than allowing the 
government to restrict or punish false statements, we depend on the 
marketplace of ideas to help us sort the true from the false. We 
allow both true ideas and false ideas to compete in this 
marketplace. Under this view, the best weapon against false speech 
is speech that is true. Counterspeech, accurate information which 
counters the false, is preferred as a remedy to government 
action.153 
 In its denial of the Free Press petition, the FCC echoed this 
view. The commission concluded: 
 
[T]he antidote to the alleged harms raised by Free Press 
is—ironically enough—a free press. The rapid and 
comprehensive coverage of the present pandemic, free from 
burdensome disclaimers, agency investigation, or other 
government oversight, advances the public interest in 
maximizing information flow, while facilitating the vetting 
of statements by public officials via the ordinary 
journalistic process.”154 
 
The FCC thus chose to “leave to the press its time-honored and 
constitutionally protected role in testing the claims made by our 
 
151 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012) (plurality opinion) 
(citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring)). 
152 Id. at 728 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
153 Id. at 727-28. 
154 FCC Response, supra note 26, at 5. 
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political leaders,”155 and to trust “the American public’s ability to 
differentiate between medical advice and political opinion.”156   
While not a perfect solution, reliance on the marketplace of 
ideas to sort accurate from inaccurate information about COVID-
19 and its effects is better than doing so through FCC enforcement 
of the broadcast hoax rule against stations who report on Trump’s 
inaccurate statements without labeling them so, or through FCC 
requiring to accompany such reporting with disclaimers. These 
actions could very well have the opposite of the intended effect, 
instead leaving the public with less information about COVID-19 
due to broadcasters deciding to limit or forego such coverage 
instead of risking investigation and potential sanction by the FCC. 
The philosophy of the First Amendment is that we allow the truth 
of these matters to come to light through the competition in the 
marketplace of ideas. While the marketplace of ideas may often 
function less than perfectly, this is to be preferred over the 






155 Id.  
156 Id. at 4 (citations omitted). 
